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Sustainable transition scholarship has recently challenged the stereotypical characterisation of socio-
technical transitions, by revisiting the concept of creative destruction. The central counterargument is
that new paradigms do not destroy old ones, but rather extend and complement them. Based on a case
study of the UK’s automotive industry, this article argues that established ﬁrms lead the industry in
technological innovation, in large part due to regional regulatory frameworks and preferential state
accumulation projects. That article then goes on to examine the ‘power ﬂows’ surrounding incumbent
ﬁrms as the primary agents of creative accumulation within global production networks. By exploring
revealing linkages between evolving government-industry relations, the motorsport sub-sector, and
component suppliers, this article renders a more nuanced understanding of incumbent ﬁrms as
empowered, multi-level agents of innovation. Finally, this article evaluates the UK’s incremental, ‘zero-
carbon’ pathway and raises some concerns about the regime’s current sociotechnical conﬁguration, and
its ﬁtness to achieve its stated goals.
© 2019 KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, newmodels of technological change
have risen to replace older neo-classical growth theories [1].
Among these, the multi-level perspective (MLP), developed by
Frank Geels, has become one of the most widely used theoretical
frameworks in contemporary transition scholarship [2]. The MLP
provides a means of investigating the core debate in transition
studies: (dynamic) stability vs. (radical) change. This interaction
occurs across multiple tiers of an industry [3,4], particularly be-
tween the regime and niche levels [5]. Like much of the work that
followed Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction [6], transi-
tion scholarship has often focused on ‘the attacker’s advantage’ [7].
For clarity, Schumpeter’s concept proposes that ‘creative’ innova-
tion is effected by the invaders - new ﬁrms or entrants to thevier on behalf of KeAi
blished by Elsevier B.V. This is anindustry - while ‘destruction’ is the fate of entrenched industry
incumbents [8]. This characterisation of technological discontinuity
has also often been invoked byMLP adherents in their explanations
of sustainable transitions [9], which hasmostly been focused on the
dismantling of existing regimes, and the emergence of new, more
sustainable technological systems [10e13].
Recently however, sustainable transition scholarship has begun
to move beyond the attacker’s advantage characterised by regime-
niche antagonism, and instead has been exploring alternative
conceptual understandings of the innovation process [14]. This has
been especially true in recent case studies of the automotive sector,
which has been described as a complex capital good industry [8,15].
The ﬁndings in these case studies imply that incumbent ﬁrms, who
are part of the automotive regime, lead the industry in low-
emission innovations via a process called ‘creative accumulation’.
Creative accumulation proposes that (a) attackers are unable to
match incumbents’ accumulated knowledge and experience, and
(b) this expertise allows incumbents to readjust and develop so-
lutions at a much faster rate. Therefore, this article’s ﬁrst researchopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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tion occurring in the UK Light Duty Vehicle (LDV) sector1? This
article will pursue this query by exploring how incumbent ﬁrms in
the UK deploy unique strategies and assets, some of which have
been overlooked or undertheorized in existing transition literature.
To probe beyond the bounds of established literature, this arti-
cle’s second research question (RQ2) is to discernwhat (if anything),
creative accumulation reveals about the nature of incumbent ‘po-
wer’ in transitions. Power asymmetries between agents in socio-
technical transitions has been a lesser explored (and developed)
aspect of the MLP, and this article seeks to contribute further to this
theoretical gap. Finally, after having addressed the ﬁrst two research
questions, RQ3will interrogate the UK’s ‘green technology’ path for
the automotive industry within the context of sustainable transi-
tions. Section 2 of this article provides an overview of the relevant
theories upon which this study builds, and Section 3 lays out the
methods of analysis employed. Section 4 presents themain ﬁndings,
Section 5 discusses their signiﬁcance and Section 6 concludes with a
summary of this study’s ﬁndings, limitations and opportunities for
future research.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Automakers, innovation and the policies that drive them
The MLP adopts a broad analytical approach to understanding
sustainable transitions in an attempt to bridge the dichotomy be-
tween technological solutions and behavioural change [16]. This
article, however, focuses on technological solutions, for the simple
reason that technologies - and the policies that drive them - are the
main elements of present-day sociotechnical systems. While others
have argued [17e20], that demand-side considerations such as
public outreach and change in personal values are unlikely to result
in meaningful sustainable transitions, this article’s technological
focus is not aimed at this debate. Rather, this article seeks to shed
new light on innovation dynamics within the automotive industry,
in the context of sustainable transitions. Themain assumption (from
a public policy perspective) is that if technology is a means by which
sustainable transitions may be achieved, then stringent regulations
are the primary driver behind motivating ﬁrms to innovate [21,22].
Ideally, low-emissions regulation ‘forces’ a measurable reduction of
harm to the environment (e.g. volume of pollutants generated) and
increased levels of R&D among ﬁrms, resulting in new innovations
[23]. These kinds of ‘technology-forcing’ policies require govern-
ments to interact with ﬁrms and markets in a manner that revolves
around regulators trying to inﬂuence ﬁrms to invest in R&D. Sub-
sequently, research has shown that ﬁrms are more likely to invest in
R&D when regulators are committed to enforcing stringent regu-
lations [24e26].
In the context of this article, low-emission technology-forcing
occurs via command and control (CAC) policies, which are deployed
by EU regulators in the automotive sector and are classiﬁed as
general regulatory instruments. More speciﬁcally, these in-
struments are deﬁned as performance standard regulations [27] for
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2) tailpipe emis-
sions, and they require automakers to meet certain emissions tar-
gets based on a ﬂeet average [28]. CAC regulations are a technology-
forcing strategy where the regulator sets an objective for the future
that cannot bemet by employing existing technologies [25,29]. CAC
policies generally regulate in two different ways: performance-
based regulations (performance standards) and technology-based1 Light Duty Vehicles are deﬁned by the UN as passenger cars and commercial
vans [104].regulations (technology standards). A performance standard is
usually the preferred approach when the goal is to induce tech-
nological innovation, because the only requirements are target
performance outputs and how they are achieved is up to the indi-
vidual ﬁrm [30,31]. In this case, emission standards for the EU
automotive industry are based on CO2 and NOx emissions, and are
considered technologically ‘agnostic’, because in theory, petrol,
diesel, electric and hybrid propulsion technologies all have an equal
opportunity to meet the speciﬁed regulations. For the practical
reason that the EU does not use technology-based policies to
regulate road transport emissions, they are not considered in this
article.
The EU regulatory framework for the automotive sector is
characterised by the certainty and stability that it provides to the
region’s member states, and this can be seen in the UK’s wholesale
adoption of EU emission performance standards in its domestic
market. The EU model of performance standards is also visibly
propagated in UK Government-Industry ventures such as the
Advanced Propulsion Centre (APC), where national innovation
competitions select ‘technology agnostic’ low-carbon innovations
that meet future EU emissions targets [26]. EU CAC regulations also
make use of time-horizons to reinforce certainty and predictability
in this type of policymaking, where for example, emissions targets
are planned out to 2050, where the expected result is an 80e95%
reduction in the EU road transport emissions [32]. Therefore, CAC
regulation predictability can reduce ambiguity around what is ex-
pected from automakers.
A second characteristic of CAC regulation that makes it espe-
cially effective in ‘forcing technology’ is its degree of stringency
[23,31], and EU emission regulations are an especially good
example of where currently, car manufacturers are obligated to
attain a ﬂeet average of 130 g CO2/Km, regardless of the technolo-
gies used [26]. This rule has been enforced by levying an Excess
Emissions Premium (EU ﬁne) on each car registered ofV5,V15, and
V25 for the ﬁrst, second and third g/km of exceedance respectively
andV95 for each additional g/km. As of 2019, however, the ﬁnewill
be V95 from the ﬁrst gram of exceedance onwards [28].
Historically, these types of fuel economy and GHG performance
standards have proven to be some of the most effective means of
reducing global oil demand and GHG emissions [33]. At their core,
environmental CAC regulatory frameworks exist to facilitate tran-
sitions towards lower-emissions technologies [34], and EU CAC
regulations have been responsible for reducing the sulphur content
in petrol, as well as phasing out leaded petrol in Europe [35]. In fact,
researchers have estimated that if EU fuel efﬁciency regulations
were abandoned, a 50% increase in current fuel taxes would be
necessary to induce similar fuel savings [36].
TheMulti-Level Perspective (MLP), however, cautions that while
governments can stimulate innovation with CAC policies, there is a
risk of too narrow a technological focus and inward-looking tech-
nical learning. We are also reminded that policy makers are
beholden to the electorate, public opinion and the automotive in-
dustry for jobs, taxes and economic growth. For these reasons, it is
argued that policymakers can only govern fromwithin the conﬁnes
of ‘the cockpit’, as they are in fact part of the system and are con-
strained by their dependence on other actors [3]. Despite these
caveats, transition scholars recognise the effectiveness of automo-
tive emissions regulations, and EU legislation in particular, citing
that while initial emissions targets could be met incrementally,
longer-term targets would probably require radical innovations [3].
MLP studies remain sceptical of EU policymaking, however, arguing
that its measures are oriented towards a green technology path
rather than a more holistic system-wide transition pathway [37].
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The MLP recognizes that in the automotive industry, the acceler-
ation and diffusion of niche innovations depends on the involvement
of regime actors (established ﬁrms) and, more speciﬁcally, relies on
collaborations between these ﬁrms and newcomers for the devel-
opmentof ‘green technologies’ [38]. Established automakers (OEMs2)
possess complementary assets such as specialized manufacturing
capabilities, distribution channels and service networks that are
otherwise unavailable to industry newcomers [39]. Despite this
recognition of the important role played by OEMs, the MLP has
traditionally portrayed these regime actors as defensive in nature,
constantly protecting their entrenched technologies and avoiding
collaborations that could endanger their core markets [5]. The
incumbent strategy toward new technologies has most often been
perceived as a ‘hedge’ against the possibility of shifting market con-
ditions in an attempt control the pace of technological change,
without ever genuinely committing to resolving fundamental envi-
ronmental issues [38]. A classic MLP argument is that industry in-
cumbents are burdened with ‘core rigidities’ of the old technological
regime [40] and thus when technological discontinuities occur, new
entrantsmaygain access to the industry throughvariousmodern-day
versions [8,41] of Schumpeter’s creative destruction (1942).2.3. An alternate theory of change
There have been however, counterarguments that creative in-
cremental accumulation has been occurring in recent times rather
than radical waves of creative destruction, where new paradigms
do not destroy old ones, but rather extend and complement them,
offsetting the attacker’s advantage [42,43]. Transport studies
looking at powertrain competition in the car industry [8] and
multi-level actors in the heavy vehicle sector [15], seem to align
with this view. They describe the automotive industry as a
routinized regime, characterised by conditions of high variability
and cumulative resources, which allows incumbents to accumulate
technological knowledge and innovative advantages over industry
newcomers. This results in technological leadership among in-
cumbents, which explains the concentration of innovation and hi-
erarchical stability among them and the low rate of entry typically
observed in the automotive industry [23]. Thus, complex systems
regimes like the automotive industry are characterised by high
entry requirements in knowledge, scale and persistence of inno-
vation [44]. Another distinctive feature of established ﬁrms is their
high levels of knowledge diversiﬁcation, particularly in upstream
technologies coupled with access to external sources of knowledge.
These ﬁrms are ‘active in a wide range of technological ﬁelds along
similar search trajectories’ [23]; p. 569) and possess the ability to
exploit opportunities with high degrees of relevance within their
network of R&D activities. A good example of this variation in
knowledge assets is the motorsport industry, discussed in later
sections, which is identiﬁed as an important feature of the auto-
motive regime and their innovative strategy. The central argument
here is that the complex knowledge-base is a fundamental barrier
to entry for newcomers in the automotive industry. However, aside
from this complex technical knowledge-base, there exists a so-
phisticated network of actors that must also be taken into consid-
eration. For example, the long-standing relationship between
OEMs and component suppliers in the development of new tech-
nologies is crucial to the analysis of low-emission innovation in the2 OEM literally stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer, however within the
automotive industry, this acronym is commonly used to refer to established auto-
makers the likes of Honda, Ford etc.automotive industry. The complexity of these automotive supply
chains has been explored in various other studies, where it has
been shown that global, regional and national actors and in-
stitutions inﬂuence the conﬁguration of these value chains [45] and
even the geography of production [46]. This high degree of cumu-
lativeness of innovation in the automotive industry gives way to
incremental innovations along a particular technological trajectory,
which in this case, manifests as low-emission innovations that can
be integrated into the regime’s current trajectory [23].2.4. ‘MLP 2.0’: creative accumulation
[8] expand on the concept of cumulative innovation by
observing that creativity is difﬁcult for incumbent ﬁrms in complex
capital goods markets. While previous literature presents cumu-
lative innovation as incremental, step-by-step reﬁnements [8], put
emphasis on the tensions between creativity and accumulation.
Creativity implies responses beyond the range of existing practices
and can be manifested through improvements in cost, performance
or quality over previous iterations. Accumulation, on the other
hand, implies knowledge creation based on existing practices,
rather than making them obsolete. Creative accumulation closely
resembles a concept Geels refers to as ‘competence-expanding’
innovation [47], which builds on previous competence-based
models of innovation [48]. Firms in complex product industries
involved in creative accumulation therefore must seek a balance
between deep component related knowledge and broad systems
related architectural knowledge, implying the added challenge of
balancing and using existing knowledge with new knowledge [8].
This perspective explains why potentially competence-destroying
or disruptive innovations have thus far failed to supplant OEMs
within the automotive industry and why automakers have
managed to survive and even increase their competitive capabil-
ities. The main reasons given by Ref. [8] are that (a) attackers are
unable to match incumbents’ accumulated knowledge and expe-
rience; (b) this expertise allows incumbents effectively to develop
solutions at a much faster rate; and (c) competition between
established ﬁrms means that new entrants are constantly trying to
hit a moving target. In addition, evolving industrial standards
guiding the regime’s technology roadmap, like the EU’s emissions
regulations, represent an additional ‘moving target’ for newcomers.
This article concedes however, that Tesla has bypassed these
evolving regulations by ‘leapfrogging’ the internal combustion
engine (ICE) and focusing on battery electric vehicle (BEV) devel-
opment instead.
Creative accumulation therefore highlights the signiﬁcance of
accelerated development, technological exploration and the inte-
gration of new competencies, which explains some of the advan-
tages that incumbents who compete in complex capital goods
industries possess [8]. The arguments made in this section, there-
fore, are based on the MLP’s broad analytical framework, while
incorporating the dynamics of creative accumulation when
explaining the processes by which established ﬁrms maintain a
competitive advantage in knowledge assets and speed of innova-
tion. This article’s rationale for adopting the Bergek’s concept of
creative accumulation (2013) is further supported by Geels et al.’s
(2016) recent reformulation of sociotechnical transition pathway
typologies, originally conceptualized by Ref. [49] nearly a decade
earlier. In redeﬁning the Transformation pathway, they acknowl-
edge that established ﬁrms are also capable of pursuing radical
innovations, contrary to what has been commonly assumed in
classic MLP literature. By going beyond the dichotomy of ‘incre-
mental incumbents’ and ‘radical newcomers’ [14], openly embrace
the validity of creative accumulation [8,15].
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Transport studies often follow the epistemological trend of us-
ing quantitative methods with a positivist world view [50,51],
which at times, has been critiqued as being archaic [52,53]. On the
other hand, it has been argued that qualitative approaches have
been steadily contributing more fully to understandings of trans-
port practices and policies [54e57]. Hence, there has been an ap-
peal for more critical (qualitative) analysis in transport studies, to
compliment the already well-established technical (quantitative)
scholarship [58]. While comparing the merits of qualitative versus
quantitative approaches is a false dichotomy, there have been calls
for the application of more varied methodologies and holistic ap-
proaches, that offer more robust theoretical underpinnings from a
wider range of disciplines [50].
Qualitative methods in transport studies are particularly useful
for inductive purposes, as it permits the identiﬁcation of concepts
and interpretations from the respondent’s perspective [12,59]. This
article makes use of such methods, with the intent to capture
relevant themes from the perspectives of automakers, regulators
and other industry stakeholders based on their experiences. It then
becomes possible to establish linkages between collections of
different sets of knowledge within the industry. The multi-level
perspective (MLP) e which is the overarching theoretical lens
used article - seeks to explain sociotechnical transitions as a sys-
temic theory of change [3]. Thus, this article makes appropriate use
of interpretative analysis, which combines theoretical sensitivity
with empirical expert assessments, often seen in other contem-
porary MLP case studies of the automotive industry [8,15,38].
This study took place between 2014 and 2019, and the ﬁndings
in this article are based on the analysis of primary data from 17
respondents that has been sampled from a larger pool of 48 semi-
structured elite interviews with key industry decision-makers
within the automotive sector (industry and government). These
stakeholders operate at the niche and regime levels of the socio-
technical system and are thus qualiﬁed to provide well-rounded
accounts of incumbent innovation within the automotive in-
dustry. Respondents were based in the UK, US, Germany and
Belgium, and were selectively targeted for their opinions on the
role of established ﬁrms in the process of sustainable transitions
within the industry. Table 1 lists the sample of elite respondent
interviews used in this article.
Interviewees were speciﬁcally selected (non-probability sam-
pling), and in this case, a combination of purposive and chain-
referral sampling, which allowed for the inclusion of keyTable 1
List of interviewees.
Institution/Organization





Ford Motor Company UK
Jaguar Land Rover




Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT)
Tesla
Torotrak Group
Transport Systems Catapult (TSC)
UK Government’s Ofﬁce for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV)
Williams Advanced Engineering (WAE)institutional actors in the data gathering process [60]. While these
methods of sampling run the risk of suffering from selection bias
and limited potential to generalize about the wider population;
many of the respondents in this study were from competing
multinational ﬁrms (automakers and suppliers), and thus their
international portfolios often qualiﬁed them to give opinions that
extended beyond national borders. Respondents also often had
competing interests (policy and commercial), and this corrobora-
tion of evidence from multiple sources made possible the trian-
gulation of information, which lends validity to these ﬁndings [61].
For these reasons, the number and variation of actors sampled
should remove most of the above concerns. Other advantages of
non-probability sampling is more direct control over the selection
process, and the inclusion of key institutional actors in the data
gathering process [60]. Additional primary data was collected from
audio recordings of presentations and Q&A panel discussions at
select industry conventions in 2015.
The data used in this study was also supported with documents
published by the automotive sector, ofﬁcial European Commission
and UK government documents, and news articles in the press.
While reports in the press are not widely used for academic sup-
port, this secondary source of data was invaluable in tracking the
daily shifting landscape of events within the automotive industry,
as well as providing context to what respondents were saying.
These secondary sources of data represent the sociotechnical
landscape within the MLP framework, which is characterised by
aspects of the exogenous environment that are outside the direct
inﬂuence of individual actors. In this instance, the landscape is a
useful metaphor used to envision the large-scale material context
of how OEMs develop and integrate low-emissions innovation into
the automotive value chain [38]. The use of secondary data also has
the added beneﬁt of contributing to the triangulation of informa-
tion effect.
In accordance with the ethics approval guidelines of this study,
express permission was granted before the recording of each
interview, participants were guaranteed anonymity and were
assured that recorded data would be destroyed in accordance with
the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998. Recorded interviews were
transcribed and thematically coded using the Template Analysis
method, which gives an account structured around central themes
that have emerged, and draws on examples from interview tran-
scripts as required [62]. The conclusions of this study are meant to
provide a robust overview of how CAC regulation affects estab-
lished ﬁrms in sustainable transitions within the automotive
industry.Title/Department
Senior Executive, Business Development
Senior Executive, Powertrain Development
Senior Executive, Leadership





Senior Executive, Business Development
Senior Engineer
Senior Executive, Transmission Systems
Senior Analyst
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4.1. The Post-2008 UK automotive industry3
Respondents in this study describe 2008 as a pivotal year for the
UK automotive industry; a time when signiﬁcant change occurred,
and the sector was transformed into one that is now led equally by
industry and by government. According to respondents, this was a
period of transition when the UK automotive industry was
adjusting to several crises, the ﬁrst of which was the ‘hollowing out’
of the UK automotive supply chain, which had started in the 1970s.
Hollowing out refers to a gradual reduction in the locally sourced
content for vehicles built in the UK, involving the ﬂight or disso-
lution of many automotive supply chain companies, or their
rationalisation within bigger groups. Respondents believe that
OEMs were partly complicit, by encouraging supply chain com-
panies to achieve low-cost sourcing in overseas territories. This loss
of productive capacity reduced the local content in UK-built vehi-
cles to approximately 35% by 2008, compared to Italy, Germany and
Spain whose levels of locally sourced content typically approached
60% [63]. A second, more immediate, crisis was that several OEMs
were in danger of bankruptcy as a result of the global ﬁnancial crisis
[64]. The ﬁnal major problem for the industry was that OEMs were
also in the midst of readjusting their corporate strategies to meet
CO2 emissions targets that had just been re-negotiated with the
European Commission that same year. The ﬁrst target to bemetwas
a ﬂeet average of 130 g CO2/km by 2015 [28], which was considered
to be a relatively short timeframe in the automotive industry.
In response to these challenges, the New Automotive Innovation
and Growth Team (NAIGT) was formed in 2008 andwas taskedwith
developing a comprehensive strategy that would help navigate the
industry past the difﬁcult times ahead. After a year’s worth of
research and discussions on the future of the UK automotive in-
dustry, one of the major results was the creation of the Automotive
Council in 2009 and the publication of its industrial strategy in 2013.
At the heart of this strategy, was the UK’s decision to transition to a
completely different business model for the island’s automotive in-
dustry. One of the major impacts was the establishment of the
Catapult network, which has been described by respondents as the
UK’s equivalent of the German Fraunhofer Society. After the Second
World War, Germany established a nationwide network of technol-
ogy innovation centres, part-funded by the federal government, and
part-funded by local state funding and regional banks. Their mission
was to help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) develop
their products, processes and commercialisation capabilities in the
marketplace. That network, built upon relationships between
academia, industry and government, is the German Fraunhofer So-
ciety. During interviews, several senior respondents believed that
within the last 7e8 years, government policy in the UK had been
inﬂuenced by the success of the Fraunhofer network in ushering in
innovation and commercialisation of R&D capabilities. Thus, the UK
Catapults have come to symbolise the government’s adoption of this
innovation framework. In total there are eleven centres in the
Catapult network, which are part-funded by the British government
with amandate to develop and produce new technologies in various
UK sectors, while attracting industry funding to match the govern-
ment’s contributions. It is important to note that a crucial element of
the Catapults’ endeavours is to involve SMEs, as they are considered
vital to the domestic value chain. Respondents believe the UK gov-
ernment’s hope is that Catapults become successful models of
innovation, and a means of introducing new ﬁrms and technologies3 For the purposes of this study, the ‘Automotive Industry’ refers exclusively to
the Light Duty Vehicle market.to the marketplace, while making the UK more competitive against
other car manufacturing nations like Germany, Japan and the USA.
Similarly, economic geographers have described these
government-industry hybrids as ‘state accumulation projects’,
whose function is to shape strategies that create, enhance and
capture value from Global Production Networks (GPNs) at a na-
tional level [65]. It has also been argued that governments make
use of Schumpeterian Competition State (SCS) strategies to develop
stronger university-ﬁrm research networks [66] for the purpose of
ﬁnancing pre-competitive research [67] and technology develop-
ment. These points are important given further arguments that
place-speciﬁc institutions, coupled with the contingent nature of
power within production networks, are critical in the mediation of
major industrial restructuring exercises [68], such as the one un-
dertaken by the UK in the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
4.2. The UK’s innovation approach: consolidated research and
development
The automotive strategy set out in the industry’s 2013 tech-
nology roadmaps4 is heavily focused on energy efﬁciency and
technological innovation, speciﬁcally low-emissions innovation.
These areas were perceived by industry respondents as an oppor-
tunity to signiﬁcantly reduce CO2 emissions from road transport.
What stood out about the UK’s revised industrial strategy was the
highly integrated (government-industry) approach that was kick-
started by the NAIGT. Take for example the UK Ofﬁce for Low
Emission Vehicles (OLEV), which is made up of representatives and
ministers from the Department for Transport (DfT), the Department
of Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) and the Department of Energy
& Climate Change (DECC). OLEV’s day-to-day operations are over-
seen byministers within those three departments in a collaborative
mission to reach ‘zero emissions’ in the UK.
Another example of integration was the leveraging of comple-
mentary assets such as the motorsport5 industry, in order to accel-
erate low-emissions innovation [69]. Respondents argue that the
relevance of FIA (Federation Internationale de l’Automobile) motor-
sport to mainstream automotive became increasingly clear as the
capability of motorsport companies to engineer more rapidly solu-
tions for testing and demonstration was recognized as a potentially
signiﬁcant asset. The focus on low-emissions innovation, brought on
by stringent EU emissions regulations, meant that much more
research and development in the areas of electriﬁcation and systems
integration (hybridisation) would need to be undertaken by the EU
automotive industry. Fortunately, not only had the FIA - through its
various championships - been developing energy efﬁcient solutions
for many years, they had also acquired key competencies that were
highly relevant to low-emissions innovation in the form of rapid
prototyping and highly skilled engineers. FIA motorsport further
supported its contribution to low-emissions innovation by encour-
aging the ‘right technologies’ on the racetrack. This was achieved
with the implementation of ‘relevant regulations’, such as the rule
changes that mandated Formula One’s transition to hybrid-electric
propulsion in 2014. This ‘common vision’ also went beyond regula-
tory and technical integration, and included administrative cooper-
ation as well, where the UK’s Motorsport Industry Association (MIA),
for example, was on the Automotive Council, as well as the Tech-
nology Council and each had their own technology roadmaps. So, a
much closer and intentional alignment developed between these
related industries, and according to a senior MIA ofﬁcial:4 For more details see Ref. [105].
5 Motorsport in the context of this article refers to Formula One racing, Formula
E, and the World Endurance Championship (WEC), which are all owned by the FIA.
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invaluable ally in the motorsport industry.
The current funding for UK propulsion technologies over the
next 10 years is set at £1 billion, which is split 50-50 between
government and industry, each contributing £500 million with a
total budget of £100 million a year for 10 years [70]. Respondents
insist that these funds do not cover production costs; instead they
have been strictly allocated to the development of future power-
train concepts. Respondents also note that the industry’s language
has transitioned from ‘engine’ to ‘propulsion’, which more accu-
rately reﬂects their low-emissions R&D agenda. According to one
industry executive: ‘Everything on the drawing board is up for
consideration’.
Among the various organizations observed in this study, the UK’s
Advanced Propulsion Centre (APC) most aptly embodies the theme
of collaborative effort within the context of low-emissions innova-
tion. The APC was formed in 2013 as a government-industry
collaboration orchestrated by the Automotive Council, with the
aim of positioning the UK as a global leader in low-emissions pow-
ertrain development and production. The APC hosts biannual com-
petitions where entrants compete by submitting low-emissions
technology project proposals. These competitions are completely
technology agnostic, meaning that any type of propulsion system
(electric, diesel, etc.) is considered, if its CO2 emissions are in line
with EU regulations. Very importantly, the submission must be part
of a collaboration between a SME - generally a university and/or a
supply chain company e and an OEM or Tier 1 supplier, because the
point of the competition is to advance those types of projects
through the ‘valley of death’. The ‘valley of death’ is an industry term
that indicates a speciﬁc point in an innovation’s lifecycle and is
underpinned by an industry measurement of 1e10, which is known
as the Technology Readiness Level (TRL).
Therefore, a newcomer (small innovator/SME) to the automotive
industry may have a working prototype, but lacks the required
resources (funds, relationships, knowledge) to get that innovation
through to the open market. Industry respondents refer to this
innovation phase as the ‘valley of death’ (TRL 4e6). According to
one senior engineer of a leading Tier 1 supplier:
Unless newcomers can actually get their innovations into pro-
duction state, it just sits on a shelf at home. So, while newcomers
may dream up superb innovations, they cannot practically get them
as an effective change in the market without knowing how to do
that, mastering the game of scale.
Therefore, according to SME respondents, niche innovations
eventually encounter a barrier, where SMEsmust set up production
lines and invest millions in equipment, and this independent
endeavour quickly becomes prohibitive. Hence if an SME wishes to
continue the transition into the LDV market, the support of an
established ﬁrm becomes essential, because considerable effort and
capital is required to ‘de-risk’ the proposition for OEMs who might
be interested.
As a tangential point of interest, newcomer respondents, who
were owners and engineers, viewed the acquisition of SMEs by
established ﬁrms (T1s or OEMs), and the sale of their intellectual
property as a desirable ﬁnancial transaction. Some SME owners
were even kept on as non-executive directors within the incum-
bent organization after the sale, as was the case when the small
electric ﬂywheel ﬁrm Flybrid Automotive, was bought by the Tor-
otrak Group in 2014 [71].
4.3. Component suppliers
The role of component suppliers, particularly Tier 1 suppliers
(T1s), in automotive innovation has been undertheorized and
mostly neglected in transition studies. This section of the ﬁndingsdiscusses role of these actors in process of automotive innovation.
According to the chief engineer of one of the UK’s largest compo-
nent suppliers:
A Tier 1 supplier is a company that can supply a component or
module that is ﬁt for purpose for primary assembly onto a vehicle. It
is delivered into the production facility of the OEM and it meets all
of their speciﬁcations and requirements. All validation (if neces-
sary) has already been done on that component and it is fully
approved, certiﬁed and ready to be assembled onto the vehicle.
The ﬁrst revealing fact to consider is that according to all re-
spondents in this study, T1s are responsible for between 75% and
90% of the technological content in any given passenger car. This
implies that OEMs are increasingly becoming systems integrators
rather than actual manufacturers, and that T1s are doing most of
the R&D and production of new technologies. According to re-
spondents, Tier 1 suppliers have become comfortable with being
the ‘R&D departments of OEMs’, and some have stated that they are
simultaneously aligning themselves with research partners such as
universities or small-companies that can feed into their business
model by providing the research capacity while they focus on the
development end. In general, suppliers have been calling for better
cooperation between themselves, universities and OEMs. For
example, in Germany, the component supplier FEV works very
closely with Aachen University [72], while AVL, another supplier,
also works closely with Graz University [73]. This type of cooper-
ation has been described as an area of weakness in the UK by
German supplier respondents, where greater engagement with
academics as well as engineers is needed, and was expressed by a
senior executive of AVL as follows:
I just think honestly, if the UK wants to stay producing
wonderful cars like JLR [Jaguar Land Rover] does, we need R&D
companies. We need companies like ourselves and FEV as well as
smaller R&D companies, and what we need honestly is a better
cooperation between universities, OEMs and companies like ours.
We have great universities in the UK, but what we’re missing in the
UK e sorry I’m German e [is] more engineers educated in the UK,
which [is] more practical, and not [just] academics. This is the thing
I would say we have to put emphasis on in the UK, because this is
done much better, sorry to say, in my own country [Germany].
UK industry respondents are especially keen to establish part-
nerships between universities, SMEs, OEMs and suppliers; facili-
tating the appropriation of intellectual property (IP) at the
academic level. This framework would allow OEMs to spot more
easily promising but undeveloped ideas that they wouldn’t usually
entertain, and translate them into production through an existing,
known and proven supply chains. One such example is the recent
long-term commitment between Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) and the
University of Warwick, with the establishment of the National
Automotive Innovation Centre (NAIC) on the university’s campus
[74]. While interesting for various reasons, the commercialisation
of academic research in this context is beyond the scope of this
article but is certainly worth future academic attention.
4.4. Supplier relationships
Among respondents, a strong sub-theme concerning the nature
of the various relationships that suppliers maintain with other ac-
tors began to emerge when discussing the role of component
suppliers in the industry. Hence, this sub-theme has been isolated
and given further consideration here.
Tier 1 suppliers develop technologies that they sell to the au-
tomakers, hence they are considered as part of the industry lobby.
They understand, however, that EU emissions regulations forces
money to be spent on the development of new technologies, which
results in reduced emissions and better fuel economy for
6 Newcomers to the industry were referred to as ‘outsiders’ by most respondents.
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and software emission control equipment, like BOSCH for example,
are T1 suppliers and therefore pay close attention to the legislation
andmaintain close contact with regulators. So, it is in the interest of
technology suppliers that regulations exist because it means that
they can develop new technologies to sell to manufacturers. During
this study, it was apparent that the good working relationship be-
tween EU policymakers and component suppliers, particularly Tier
1 suppliers, has proven to be a valuable resource to the European
Commission in bolstering their credibility as regulators. The
Regulator-Supplier relationship is an important one because sup-
pliers are keenly aware of what is technically possible in the context
of providing regulators with feedback on future regulations. This
relationship helps to compensate for the technical knowledge
asymmetry between regulators and OEMs and allows regulators to
better approximate the real emissions targets that OEMs can ach-
ieve. There is a balance that must be preserved, however, and
suppliers are careful to remain neutral because they must balance
their relationship with the OEMs who are their primary customers,
with the demands and requirements of the legislators. Suppliers
thereforee according to one respondent - try to keep a ‘low proﬁle’
in their interactions with regulators. It is important note however,
that while suppliers can help regulators close the knowledge gap
with OEMs, suppliers can equally conspire to deceive regulators.
This was made painfully evident when Tier 1 supplier BOSCH,
designed and supplied malicious software with the engine control
unit (ECU) at the heart of the Volkswagen diesel scandal [75].
On the other hand, the relationship betweenTier 1 suppliers and
OEMs can be contentious and even adversarial at times, for a va-
riety of reasons. One popular point of contention among re-
spondents was the issue of open book pricing. Open book pricing
(or costing) is a parts-buying program where the OEM forgoes
conventional supplier bidding. Instead, the OEM inspects the sup-
pliers’ factories, analyses their internal cost data and makes them
an offer based on that analysis. Suppliers who agreemay be privy to
an exclusive contract with that OEM for periods ranging up to the
life of a vehicle. Open book pricing has been difﬁcult for suppliers as
they perceive it as OEMs ‘ﬂexing their muscles’. According to one
senior executive, when OEMs use open book pricing, they are in
effect saying; ‘Tell us exactly how you’ve priced this component,
otherwise you won’t get the businesses’.
In the past, suppliers have perceived this practice to be ruthless
[76], but some supplier respondents now believe there has been
some softening and leniency from the OEMs. These respondents are
of the opinion that OEMs realise their success is becoming increas-
ingly reliant on good relationshipswith their suppliers. Recently Tier
1s have also been partnering together, creating a larger, more stable
and commercially robust presence in the marketplace.
4.5. The OEM advantage in scale and scope
We have already seen that the ability to develop and deploy
innovation quickly is one of the crucial differences between in-
cumbents and newcomers. Not only are OEMs able to deploy their
upscaling capabilities in their R&D and innovations, but they are
also able to use this same concept of scale when sourcing from
suppliers as a cost cutting measure. A senior executive of a major
OEM gave the example of grouping together with other OEMs to
procure electric batteries at a signiﬁcantly reduced price. This tactic
was not only an exercise in cost cutting, but also a strategic move to
keep overall costs down in the face of incoming competition from
industry newcomers. According to one industry executive:
The expertise of the OEM lies in their ability to get an innovation
into production and make 20,000 cars of it.
Another strategy frequently employed by OEMs is economies ofscope, in the form of ‘platform sharing’. Due to the modular ar-
chitecture of the automobile, OEMs may share several design
components between themselves and then apply their own
branding to the ﬁnished product. Respondents admitted that they
know, and have already proven, that consumers buy brands not
engines. The example given by a senior automotive executive to
illustrate this was that the Bentley Continental and the Volkswagen
Phaeton share the same chassis, yet one demands £250,000 and the
other £60,000. He argued that the platform, ride quality and many
other features are comparable, yet consumers are content buying
both Bentleys and Volkswagens. There is already extensive plat-
form sharing occurring between automakers, and respondents
have signalled that this practice is moving towards collaborative
technology development and is bound to accelerate in the face of
challenges from ‘outsiders’.6 One example of this is the collabora-
tion between BMW, Nissan, Renault and Volkswagen on the Rapid
Charge Network (RCN) where they are jointly developing a multi-
standard, rapid charging network for electric vehicles throughout
the UK and Ireland [77].
5. Analysis and discussion
5.1. RQ1: established ﬁrms as multi-level agents in the UK LDV
sector
The ﬁndings in this article align with recent reassessments in
transition literature [8,14,15] about the role of established ﬁrms in
the automotive industry. This study found that OEMs leverage
strategic relationships (with newcomers and other incumbents),
and economies of scale and scope (mass production and platform
sharing), which further reinforces their dominance of incremental
innovation within the industry. In particular, this article highlights
the OEMs’ use of the motorsports industry, which represents a
specialized and complementary asset, as yet another example of
incumbents’ disproportionate access to complex knowledge and
expertise [5]. More signiﬁcantly, this article’s examination of
component suppliers contributes to a clearer understanding of
types of established ﬁrms as multi-level actors within the auto-
motive sector. This study identiﬁed component suppliers as the
most innovative, yet themost obscured, ‘class’ of established ﬁrm in
this particular regime. They conduct the majority of R&D, while
maintaining good relationships with OEMs and regulators. Thus,
their expertise makes them indispensable to any ﬁrm within the
automotive value chain. Relationships with suppliers are not only
unavoidable, but also mutually beneﬁcial, especially for new-
comers, who are trying to commercialize their intellectual prop-
erties and penetrate the mainstream market. OEMs, on the other
hand, use component suppliers to reinforce their innovative and
productive capacity - and by proxy - their dominant positionwithin
the automobility regime. This article therefore proposes that in the
UK, the predominant means of automotive innovation occurs via
creative accumulation, and that OEMs and (to a lesser extent)
suppliers are its principal agents.
5.2. RQ2: power in automotive sociotechnical transitions
Historically, the concept of power has been malleable and
‘notoriously open to interpretation’ [78], however, this study draws
upon more realist understandings of power [79] from research in
global production networks where power ‘is both causal in that it
derives from structures and actual in that it only exists when active’
[65]; p. 522). Thus, unlike other perspectives (like actor network
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based, this section examines how accumulation and ﬁnancial size
enables some ﬁrms to exert ‘power over’ others.
Political and economic power as a determinant in sustainable
transitions has long been identiﬁed as an area in need of more
academic attention within the context of the MLP [4,80], and is
relevant here as this article discusses the creative accumulation
process, which is a derivation of the former. In response to the MLP,
other researchers have insisted that regime power players are able
to inﬂuence multi-level dynamics disproportionately compared to
other agents within a given sociotechnical system. Furthermore, it
has been argued that newcomers’ success ultimately rests on
sponsorship from these ‘more powerful’ regime agents, and thus
newcomer potential is ultimately screened and ﬁltered through
regime power structures [4,81].
Over the years [80,82] has responded to these critiques, and
while acknowledging that ‘power struggles’ in the MLP are less
developed, he argues that political science research has begun to ﬁll
this gap by classifying power in the MLP as relational, dispositional
and structural at the niche, regime and landscape levels respec-
tively [83]. Others have also conceptualized power in the MLP in
various forms from political processes [84] and shifting power re-
lations [85], to Foucauldian inspired perspectives of constitutive
power [86,87]. While the authors of creative accumulation [27]
have used it to explain incumbents’ various advantages within re-
gimes, they have thus far not linked these advantages to power
beyond niches’ susceptibility to contradictory agendas.
This article, however, seeks to develop additional theoretical
linkages between power and the process of creative accumulation.
First off, while government-industry partnerships involve the
active participation of government, universities, SME’s and in-
cumbents (OEMs and suppliers), they remain primarily state
accumulation projects. As such, they represent regulatory in-
stitutions and local socio-cultural conditions that are part of larger
accumulation strategies or models of economic growth [66]. Thus,
while states may freely set the conditions of engagement with
ﬁrms, state strategies and revenues still very much depend upon
capital accumulation, and thus are inclined to favour supporting
larger ﬁrms and multinational agents (OEMs) [65]. Furthermore,
while OEMs e as agents of the automotive GPN e are subject to
these state policies [88], they have a greater capacity to lobby said
state policies in pursuit of their own interests [89]. This tendency
for state projects to favour large incumbents is also reinforced by
globalization and the ‘internationalization of the state’ [65,90,91] as
it endeavours to capture key segments of the GPN within its na-
tional boundaries. It must be noted that states can also pressure
OEMs to establish production close to end markets, as the high
costs and visibility of passenger vehicles can attract political
backlash if the share of imported vehicles becomes too large [46].
Thus, the UK retains the power to negotiate its incorporation into
the automotive GPN using a variety of strategies.
[82] describes the government-industry alliance as a ‘stable and
hegemonic historical bloc’, however, others have asked [4] how
shifts in such an alliance might affect the balance of power for or
against a certain sociotechnical regime? The argument can bemade
that deep shift occurred in 2015, beginning with the Volkswagen
emissions scandal (aka ‘Dieselgate’), where the interests of gov-
ernment and automakers diverged, trust was eroded, and various
adversarial consequences ensued, including ﬁnes, arrests and more
stringent regulatory oversight [26]. [83] argues that achieving and
maintaining trust within multi-actor environments is key ‘in
exercising power to foster change’ [83]; p. 283). Thus, while the UK
‘techno-institutional complex’ [92] or ‘historical bloc’ [93] maywell
remain intact today, its conﬁguration and strength of relationships
(and subsequently its ability to inﬂuence transitions) may vary.At the incumbent level, we see them leveraging economies of
scale and scope, specialized and complementary assets, and inter-
ﬁrm arrangements, which is further reinforced by UK state accu-
mulation projects in the form of government technological road-
maps and government-industry partnerships; resembling [83]
notion of dispositional power. Incumbents’ power, speciﬁcally
OEMs, is largely due to their strategic role in coordinating and
organizing automotive GPNs [65]. They are in essence ‘empowered
network agents’ that ‘collect and condense’ power [94], and thus
their accumulated resources and corporate strategies confers upon
them a certain ‘power’ over suppliers and SMEs. This study
encountered one example of this in the previously discussed
practice of ‘open book pricing’. Another example is ‘follow sourcing’
where large suppliers are required to ‘co-locate’ or establish local
parts production centres close to OEMs’ ﬁnal assembly plants to
ensure timely delivery [46].
Within technological niches (were incumbents also operate), we
see the differences in innovative competencies (rapid prototyping,
IP acquisition, tacit knowledge asymmetries) between incumbent
and newcomer agents, which is what [83] would describe as rela-
tional power. In sum, the size and power of OEMs results in
asymmetrical power relationships within multi-level networks and
selection environments, where OEMs can appropriate innovation
developed by actors at the micro level (niche), and in turn capture
local and regional economies of scale and scope fostered by state
policies (regimes) [65].
5.3. The UK’s creative accumulation pathway
The UK’s automotive sector is a longstanding, stable industry,
characterised by deeply entrenched isomorphism and powerful
landscape determinants that reinforce the existing regime [95].
However, in 2008, the landscape shifted and threatened to usher in
an era of de-alignment or breakdown in the regime [3]. Faced with
several challenges, the automotive industry moved quickly to
restructure itself in a manner that integrated the efforts of policy-
makers and industry stakeholders into a common vision. The new
partnership between government and industry was built around a
vertical development framework, where the common vision tran-
scended from the landscape level down to the niche levels of the
industry. The transition pathway chosen by the UK was one of in-
cremental low-emissions innovation, which is promoted as being
technologically agnostic, and was supported with the establish-
ment of development centres such as Transport Systems Catapult
and the APC. Post-crisis, the UK engaged in overt industrial policy
intervention, as it considered its automotive sector ‘too big to fail’.
Some academics have since suggested that public policymust move
beyond simple ‘market ﬁxing’ to mission-oriented ‘market-
creating’ [96].
For the UK, the automotive sector is considered a ‘pillar’ industry
and therefore an era of technological transformation [14,49] was
introduced in alignment with the newly conceptualized technology
roadmaps. This new era, however, was not led by ‘niche-in-
novations’, but insteadwas driven by public-private partnerships or
‘state accumulation projects’ [65], which shaped the UK strategy to
create, enhance and capture value from the automotive GPN at the
national level. These state projects play a crucial role in the ‘scalar
management’ of industrial restructuring [90], and by proxy privi-
lege incumbent ﬁrms, particularly OEMs, within the automotive
regime.
The cooperation between government and industry in the UK
effectively acts as a translator [97], or a bridging construct [39], for
the rapid development of new technologies beyond incubators or
niches and into broader market spaces [5]. In the case of the UK
market, established ﬁrms engage in innovation at all levels of the
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the steady development of promising technologies.
The valley of death represents the ‘Schumpeterian barrier’ [78]
to entry for newcomers, however as the UK government pairs SMEs
with established ﬁrms to overcome this challenge, this in effect
funnels viable niche IPs into larger ﬁrms and onto OEM production
lines. This an example of how the national governance infrastruc-
ture around innovation acts as a ‘R&D pipeline’ of sorts for in-
cumbents, where niche technology development in the UK is
screened and ﬁltered by government-industry projects. While
newcomers can often signal new technological opportunities, their
cognitive search for innovation in the UK is ultimately guided by
the post-2008 low-emissions agenda.
At the regional level, EU regulations are reasonably broad and
technologically agnostic, but they create a selection environment
[24] at the national level, and in the UK is characterised by the
‘common vision’ of the government-industry projects, also
described as Schumpeterian Competition State (SCS) strategies
[65]. This common vision naturally dictates the viability of new
technologies that are brought to the marketplace, meaning that
these innovations end up being signiﬁcantly shaped by UK state
projects, which also embody EU’s CAC regulations. As one APC
executive aptly observed:
I’ll go back to the classic quote ‘necessity is the mother of all
invention’. It’s been EU regulations in my opinion, that drives the
innovation. We’ve got to hit certain CO2 targets for cars and that
drives the OEMs which in turn affects the SMEs’ ideas and
innovations.
This quote sums up the underlying consensus among re-
spondents, which was that EU CAC policies are a primary concern
for technology ﬁrms seeking relevance in the UK LDV market.
5.4. RQ3: the state of ‘sustainable transitions’ in the UK automotive
industry
This article has described the dynamics of change in the UK
automotive industry as one of ‘technological greening’ via creative
accumulation within the context of the MLP, however the purpose
of this section is to contrast these processes against a few objec-
tively observable outcomes. A commonly stated goal within the
transition research community is the accelerated ‘dismantling’ of
existing sociotechnical regimes in favour of more sustainable al-
ternatives [4,12]. However, in the face of such motivations, it is
imperative to establish feedback loops for the purpose of assessing
the effectiveness any intervention tasked with achieving ‘low-car-
bon’ outcomes.
The UK government-industry project suffered a major tremor in
2015 when several OEMs, the most prominent of which was
Volkswagen deceived regulators by ﬁtting ‘defeat devices’ -
developed by BOSCH, a Tier 1 supplier - into several of their diesel
models. The result was that during real world driving, toxic NOx
emissions were up to 40 times higher than Volkswagen’s stated test
results. While the regulatory failures on EU’s behalf [26], and
technical nature of the deception [75] have been previously
explored, it remains important to highlight this event as a signiﬁ-
cant ‘black eye’ for automotive decarbonisation in the UK. This
event eroded trust between government and incumbents,
prompting outright bans on diesel vehicles in some European cities
[98], and sparking a national debate in the UK on a nationwide ban
on the sale of newpetrol and diesel cars by 2040. The general public
has also been soured against diesel vehicles to the point where for
the ﬁrst time since monitoring started, petrol vehicles began
outselling diesels in the UK and EU in 2017 [99]. Unfortunately the
negative externalities do not stop there, as consumer migration
away from diesels and towards petrol vehicles has now created asort of “CO2 bulge”, where for the ﬁrst time in 20 years, aggregate
new vehicle CO2 has risen in the UK and EU, not decreased
[100,101]. Current (2018) new vehicle CO2 levels in the UK has
backslid to 2014 levels. While the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs)
in the UK continues to increase, it not yet at a scale that can
compensate for rising CO2 emissions from increased petrol vehicle
sales. In all likeliness, the UK (and possibly the EU) will not achieve
the current EU 2021 passenger car CO2 targets. At what point will
EV adoption, in conjunction with incremental innovation in com-
bustion engines, drive back down new vehicle CO2 in the UK and
the EU?
The UK’s own transition out of the EU adds another layer of
obscurity to these events. After ‘Brexit’, the EU’s calculation of new
vehicle CO2 will no longer consider vehicles sold in the UK, thus
ﬂeet averages will be spread across a smaller geographic area. How
will this affect OEMs’ ability to achieve EU targets? Could the UK
become a ‘dumping ground’ for higher emission vehicles? With the
closure or curtailing of several OEM manufacturing plants and
operations in the UK, how will the UK renegotiate its government-
industry partnerships? More importantly, how will the UK recon-
ﬁgure its state accumulation projects to maintain competitiveness
within the automotive GPN, as it becomes untethered from EU CO2
automotive emissions obligations? The answers to these questions
will carry signiﬁcant implications for sustainable automotive
transitions in the UK and are deserving of future academic inquiry.
The UK’s macro state strategy, which previously locked society
into diesel propulsion as a ‘low(er)-carbon’ solution, has now
decided to reverse course on that trajectory, and is aggressively
pursuing the adoption of Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs). This
article also urges future transition scholars to carefully consider the
near and medium-term implications of such a pursuit, given the
lessons learned from the failed diesel lock-in, and emerging sus-
tainability concerns regarding the manufacturing, recycling and
eventual disposal of depleted lithium-ion battery stockpiles.
Despite sustainable transitions being somewhat of an ‘essen-
tially contested concept’ [78], this article argues that OEMs’ almost
exclusive focus on incremental innovation reﬂects their control of
intellectual property, value price reduction and the overall power
asymmetries that exist within automotive value chains [65].
Contributing to this is the fact that publicly traded incumbents,
responding to share-holder pressure to achieve short term proﬁts,
seek to minimize the risk of disruptive innovation and newcomers
to their sector, whereas newcomers are more likely to attempt
disruptive technologies [89]. Thus, if OEMs (and suppliers)
continue to make ‘tactical knowledge investments based solely on
cost reduction potential’ [106], where getting new technologies
considered requires a cost advantage, this will compromise their
collective ability [102] to move beyond incremental innovations.
6. Conclusion
According to Nelson and Winter (1977, p. 41) ‘Any useful and
coherent theory of innovation must recognise explicitly the factors
that differ across industries’. Therefore, the ‘meso-level’, sector-
speciﬁc analysis conducted in this article represents an attempt
to deliver operational insights into the role of established ﬁrms in
sustainable transitions within the automotive industry.
The article’s ﬁrst contribution, therefore, is a clearer rendering of
how industry incumbents (OEMs and suppliers), supported by cu-
mulative resources and state policies derived from EU regulations,
dominate the multi-level pursuit of incremental energy efﬁcient
innovation within the UK automotive industry. Second, this article
makes use of public policy and economic geography scholarship to
offer a nuanced interdisciplinary understanding of power, and
where it resides within automotive sociotechnical regimes. Finally,
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power ﬂows throughout the UK automotive regime, this article
compares present day regime outcomes with the stated goals of
sustainable transitions. Thus this article’s broad analytical view on
agency contributes additional understandings ‘about the interests
and sources of power shaping selection environments and gener-
ating variations’ [4]; p. 446) within the automotive industry.
While most of the ﬁndings in this article are based on a UK case
study, many of them are generalizable to thewider EU industry. The
three main reasons being that (1) most respondents in this study
are multinational organizations that operate across borders, (2) UK
automotive low-emission policies are an instantiation of relevant
EU regulations7 and (3) the UK is the 2nd largest vehiclemarket and
the 4th largest car manufacturer in the EU [103]. Given the insights
set out in this article, it may be possible for transition scholars to
apply some of these concepts to better understand sustainable
transitions in other highly regulated, complex capital goods in-
dustries such as the energy, aerospace and construction sectors.References
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